|
BLUE RIBBON PANEL RECOMMENDATION |
ADC
RESPONSE |
DISCUSSION and
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT |
Status |
LEAD DIVISION |
| A. INMATE SECURITY |
|
1. a. Review and enforce search procedures upon
arrival at the kitchen. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION In order to perform searches
of inmate kitchen workers as per policy, additional FTE are required; a
determination of need for additional FTE is completed.
·0 Two newly created temporary security
posts were established for each unit kitchen at ASPC-Lewis and
searches are performed as required.
·1 Other Complexes assign additional
FTE to staff kitchen security posts in their food preparation areas
whenever possible.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
In addition to pat searching kitchen workers upon arrival and strip
searching them at departure, inmates who depart the mess hall after
meals are also randomly pat searched.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
|
Implemented
|
Offender Operations
|
|
b. Determine where other gaps in search coverage may
exist that would provide inmates opportunities to pick up contraband and
weapons as they transit areas. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION Pat and strip searches
performed as per policy at all inmate work locations.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
NB: The February 2003 Buckley after-action also identified this
deficiency. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
2. DOC should continue to practice cross-gender
pat-down searches when necessary. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION ADC will continue to perform
cross-gender pat searches as per policy.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
ADC contacted other state correctional systems in the 9th
Circuit about their (court approved) practices. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
3. Establish a Special Contraband Squad (SCS), either
statewide or with one squad in each of the two regions, the sole
function of which would be to conduct random, unannounced searches of
prison units for contraband and weapons. SCS searches would be supported
by the latest available detection equipment technology and trained
canines. The SCS would be specially trained in the latest detection
methods, uses of equipment, and methods employed by inmates to secret
contraband. The selected unit would be placed on lockdown as soon as SCS
arrives onsite, and the SCS would be accompanied by unit mid-level and
base-level supervisory staff during the search. All areas of the
selected unit would be searched during the lockdown. No shift change or
movement of inmates would be permitted during the search. Only those
officials with an absolute need to know would be informed of the pending
search and then only at the last minute. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Tactical Support (TSU) and Special Services (SSU) Units used to
conduct random, unannounced comprehensive searches of prison units for
contraband and weapons. Complex searches discontinued in 2002; will be
re-instated and performed by SCS.
·2 The SCS sole function will be to conduct
random, unannounced searches of prison units for contraband and
weapons.
·3 The SCS will be issued the latest
available detection equipment technology and trained canines.
·4 The SCS will also specially train in the
latest detection methods, uses of equipment, and methods employed by
inmates to secret contraband.
·5 The selected unit or site will be placed
on lockdown as soon as the SCS is onsite, and the SCS will be
accompanied and assisted by unit line and supervisory staff.
·6 All areas of the selected unit or area
will be searched during the lockdown.
·7 Any movement of staff or inmates in the
area being searched will be by permission of the SCS team only.
·8 Only those officials at the selected
site or unit with an absolute need to know will be informed by the
SCS of the pending search and then only at the last minute.
Pending formation of SCS, unit-wide searches at ASPC-Lewis have
begun.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
NB: The March 2003 Buckley after-action also identified this
deficiency. |
Implemented, ASPC-Lewis
Phase 1 funding, ADC
|
Offender Operations |
|
4. All incoming staff, contractors and visitors and
their possessions should be scanned and/or searched for contraband prior
to gaining access to the unit. If contraband is detected, discretionary
progressive punitive measures should be imposed, ranging from a warning
to dismissal and/or prosecution. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
A thorough search of all incoming staff, contractors and visitors and
their possessions has been reinstated
at Complex VIP check-in and each unit at ASPC-Lewis.
Walk-through metal detectors and handheld trans-friskers are also in use
again.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
ADC policy requires all complexes to perform a quarterly search of
all incoming vehicles. ASPC-Lewis now complies.
ASPC-Lewis complex traffic control post has been established.
All units’ outer entrance gates are now secured.
All units’ pedestrian sally port at main control is now secured.
The staff shoe shine stand was moved to reduce and redirect inmate
traffic from the administration building’s main control area.
All activities are being enforced department-wide. Regional oversight
teams established to implement and monitor for compliance. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
5. a. All post orders should be reviewed to assure
that explicit direction is given relative to inmate search requirements
prior to movement within the unit perimeter and when the inmate returns
from travel outside the unit. The review should focus on minimizing the
ability of inmates to access hidden contraband prior to entering less
secure areas. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Review and revision of all post orders in process to ensure each is
clearly written and provides sufficient details. Post orders now feature
boiler plate language to ensure uniformity in communication of
agency-wide expectations. Staff receives post specific training.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Written instruction now includes expanded search requirement of the
area when a shank is found.
An ad hoc Committee is evaluating how the policy review process may
be streamlined so that new and revised departmental directives are
issued sooner. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
b. Consideration should be given to changing search
methods on a random rotational basis to disrupt predictability. Search
requirements should be strictly enforced by supervisory personnel,
including personal unannounced oversight. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
An assessment of core security practices is in
process and the methods by which searches and shake downs occur revised
to compliment the implementation of SCS.
The field’s best practices are being identified and
will be evaluated and incorporated on an on-going basis.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Regional oversight teams established to verify
compliance. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
6. a. Shanks are a continual and recurring problem in
the corrections world. Current procedures and methods for preventing the
manufacture and uncovering the concealment of fabricated weapons must be
emphasized and regularly tested. |
Agree
|
DISCUSSION
Staff security alerts stopped in 2002, now resumed.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The Technology Review Committee assessments also discontinued in
2002; now reinstated.
Procurement practices reviewed to reduce likelihood any product
introduced in the secure perimeter may be made into or used as a weapon
by inmates.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
|
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
b. Additionally, DOC should consider whether
state-of-the-art detection systems not already employed could be brought
to bear in this area. Technology notwithstanding, the last line of
defense for the detection of fabricated weapons is the individual
vigilance and competence of correctional officers and their leaders. |
Agree
|
DISCUSSION
The Technology Review Committee assessments were
discontinued in 2002; assessments are reinstated.
The annual auditing of correctional complexes was discontinued in
2001; the newly formed Peer-Review assessment team has completed its
evaluation of staff’s compliance with policy and procedure at ASPC-Lewis
and developed action plans in concert with unit staff whenever
necessary. The peer review assessment process is taking place at all
other complexes as soon as possible this year, and annually thereafter.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
All staff is also being evaluated for proficient performance of core
correctional practices and supervisors’ leadership skills are being
assessed as well; on-the-job-re-training (OJRT) provided to line staff
and supervisors who fail to perform adequately.
·9 27 percent of the officers at ASPC-Lewis
initially performed at less than 70 percent proficiency (POST
standard). Department-wide, 12.8 percent of the line staff performed
at less than 70 percent proficiency.
·10 29 percent of ASPC-Lewis’ supervisors
initially performed below 80 percent proficiency. Department-wide,
18.2 percent of ADC supervisors performed at less than 80 percent
proficiency.
|
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
7. DOC should review protocols for unit contraband
searches to emphasize thoroughness, unpredictability and consistency. |
Agree
|
DISCUSSION
An ad hoc Committee assessed the agency’s protocols and surveyed the
field’s best practices for incorporation.
ADDDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Post orders modified as necessary to require frequent, random
searches of persons, property and the physical plant.
Shank analysis reinstated and findings timely distributed to security
staff.
Overall evaluation of pre-service and in-service instruction,
including an assessment of the effectiveness of classroom and OJT
instruction in core competencies such as searches of persons, property
and the physical plant, in process.
OJRT also in process. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
| B. YARD
SECURITY |
|
8. Consider removing gravel or other soft materials
from the yards and replacing them with a more stable ground cover that
is less likely to provide cover for weapons or contraband. |
Agree
|
DISCUSSION
Gravel was often applied deeper than necessary to reduce
erosion, control dust, and mitigate flooding.
A security magnet was used to sweep all units. Gravel has been
re-graded; its depth reduced to prevent hiding shanks in gravel.
ADC conferred with sister state systems to identify other means to
reduce erosion, control dust, and mitigate flooding. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
| C. KITCHEN
SECURITY AND PROCEDURES |
|
9. Rotate inmates’ work assignments and schedules so
that they have less opportunity to familiarize themselves with officers’
routines and work habits. |
Agree
|
DISCUSSION
To reduce risk associated with inmates who are detailed to certain
work assignments:
·11 ADC periodically assesses inmates’
propensity for violence, likelihood of escape, reclassifies
regularly.
·12 Evaluate all work assignments for risk.
·13 Assign or re-assign inmates to work
assignments in keeping with the risk they may present to others.
ADC also rotates officers and revises their duties as appropriate.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
ADC contacted NIC for assistance with its classification of inmates.
Subject-matter experts provided by NIC have worked with ADC to revise
its classification system. The revised system is undergoing a two-part
validation process this fiscal year. All inmates will be reclassified
this calendar year. |
Implemented |
Programs Services |
|
10. Dangerous inmates should be limited in their work
assignments, and inmates with life or long-term sentences should be
strictly limited in their range of duties. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
To reduce risk associated with inmates detailed to certain work
assignments, the ADC new classification system will:
·14 As certain dangerousness by periodically
assessing inmates’ propensity for violence and likelihood of escape
·15 Classify inmates for work assignments
by risk – a pilot to validate this instrument will conclude shortly
at Rast and Central units and Phoenix West.
·16 Assign or re-assign inmates to work
assignments appropriate to the risk they may present to others.
ADC will periodically reclassify work assignments by risk.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
Pending revision of the classification system, ASPC-Lewis staff has
completed its review of inmate kitchen workers’ suitability to remain in
higher risk work assignments by examining those inmates’ institutional
and criminal histories for propensity for fight and flight.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
NIC is assisting ADC with its classification of inmates. |
Implemented |
Programs Services |
|
11. DOC or other appropriate authorities should
interview the contracted kitchen staffers who worked at the Morey
Kitchen for at least six months preceding the hostage incident. Any
potential complicity should be thoroughly investigated. |
Agree
|
DISCUSSION
Information about the contract worker and specific inmate kitchen
workers who failed to cooperate during the criminal investigation was
timely provided to MCCA.
·17 The Canteen employee who called in sick
on 1/18 and subsequently refused to cooperate with investigators has
since submitted to a polygraph in which no deception was detected.
Former Canteen employees interviewed. No complicity indicated.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
ADC is exploring other means of meal service delivery. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
12. a. The door to the Kitchen Office should remain
locked at all times unless it is opened to allow a correctional officer
to enter or exit. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
ADC agrees that the door to the kitchen office should remain locked
at all times and the kitchen office restricted to authorized,
correctional personnel and contract food services employees only. Door
closures and locks have been installed on kitchen and tool room doors
and new double-sided locks have been installed on kitchen office doors
in the units at ASPC-Lewis. Security sally ports have been installed.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
NB: Not all ADC kitchens have offices. Where offices are provided,
only authorized personnel are permitted. Inmates are expressly
prohibited access to the kitchen office.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
An ad hoc Committee conducted a security assessment department-wide. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
b. A standoff distance should be established in the
kitchen that an inmate cannot cross. If this area is occupied, the door
to the kitchen office should remain locked until it is clear of inmates
(e.g., a line painted red at the entrance to the ramp that leads up to
the office). |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
In place, medium and high custody complexes. Design of level 2 (low
medium) kitchens not conducive and custody level does not require
modification of physical plant.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
An ad hoc Committee conducted security assessment department-wide. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
13. DOC should consider methods that will eliminate
the need to pass kitchen utensils in a hand-to-hand manner. For example,
a pass-through security drawer to deliver utensils, operated by the
kitchen officer, could be installed. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Kitchen tools are now secured at work stations prior to inmate
workers performing their assignments, all complexes.
Security sally ports installed.
Regional oversight teams established to implement and monitor for
compliance department-wide.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
An ad hoc Committee conducted a security assessment. It included a
review of other after-action reports generated since the homicide of CO
Lumley in 1997 resulting from the failure to restrict inmates’ access to
control rooms and most recently, an after-action report completed in
March 2003 concerning the Buckley Unit at ASPC-Lewis. That report also
recommended but never implemented restricting inmate access to towers by
discontinuing med passes and securing kitchen offices. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
14. Utensils and tools should be secured. This action
may be less necessary at low-level units, but the administration at such
units should utilize caution before implementing such a policy. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
ASPC-Lewis reduced its inventory of kitchen tools, reconfigured
shadow boards, updated and made uniform its inventory of kitchen tools,
and cabled instruments in use at workstations, all custody levels.
Agency-wide action taken.
An ad hoc security committee developing practices to be adopted by
custody level department-wide.
Security audits including assessments of compliance with tool and key
control were conducted annually until 2001 when they were discontinued;
department-wide peer reviews now underway annually. Regional Compliance
Teams established to ensure timely implementation.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The newly created peer-review process includes an on-site audit for
compliance with tool control and provides on-site assistance as
necessary with inventorying kitchen tools, updating inventory lists of
tools, and reconfiguring shadow boards. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
15. Two correctional officers should be posted in the
kitchen area at all times. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Correctional officers shall be posted in the kitchen consistent with
the number and custody level of the inmate workers who are assigned, and
officers’ ability to monitor their activity as per the design of the
physical plant, augmented by security mirrors, cameras, etc.
ASPC-Lewis has increased its kitchen security posts from 1 to 2 per
unit pending installation of security cameras at which time the number
of posts may be adjusted. The governing post order has been revised as
well.
Please note that currently, not all complexes’ unit kitchens have
offices and not all units’ kitchens have a dedicated security post.
Officers are assigned to other complexes’ kitchens when staffing
permits.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
An assessment of the impact of the cameras installed at ASPC-Lewis
will serve as the basis for further purchases. |
Implemented, ASPC-Lewis
Future funding, ADC
|
Offender Operations |
|
16. Place high-resolution video cameras in the
kitchen area to provide visibility of inmate activities from the
facility’s main control area. Camera feed should be live-monitored
instead of merely being recorded for after-the-fact-review. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Areas in ASPC-Lewis kitchens for digital cameras and monitors have
been identified.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Cameras will be installed in kitchens at ASPC-Lewis as a pilot study
and evaluated for effectiveness prior to installing department wide.
NB: Some kitchens in other complexes are not suitable for
installation of cameras. |
Phase 1 funding , ASPC-Lewis |
Support Services |
| D. TOWER SECURITY,
PROCEDURES AND USAGE |
|
17. DOC should review the need to staff the central
towers at Lewis and other architecturally similar institutions in the
DOC system. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
An ad hoc committee assessed the utility and utilization of the
towers. Recommended modifications to physical plant, posts, staffing and
equipment commensurate with units’ custody level and utilization.
Recommendations implemented in full.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The ad hoc committee surveyed other states’ correctional systems for
best practices concerning inmate movement and its monitoring and yard
management including an evaluation of the effectiveness of indirect
supervision from interior towers versus direct supervision of inmates by
officers at ground level in recreational yards. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
18. Non-removable listening devices should be
installed in the tower. |
TBD; see 17 |
DISCUSSION
The assessment of tower utilization, staffing and technology,
completed. The ad hoc committee conferred with other state correctional
systems to determine whether listening devices are used and useful; the
preferred option has been identified.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The Technology Review Committee assessments were
discontinued in 2002; assessments reinstated. Now continuously evaluates
the market and elicits feedback from other state correctional systems. |
Phase 1 funding |
Support Services |
|
19. DOC should improve cameras, camera location and
lighting at all controlled entry points to the tower to allow for
positive identification of persons seeking entry. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The ad hoc Security Committee in process of determining if other
locations and entry points would benefit from digital cameras or
additional cameras and better lighting.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The Technology Review Committee was discontinued in 2002; reviews
reinstated to continuously evaluate the market and elicit feedback from
other state correctional systems about features such as one-way glass
for control rooms and towers. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
20. a. The tower should be accessed only at one entry
point. The panel recommends limiting access from the Administration
building spline. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Access to the interior towers restricted to the Administration
building spline only; no access from the B-building is permitted.
Interior yard gates are now chained and locked shut.
Post orders prohibiting inmate access and restricting staff access to
interior towers from any other location in the yard in place.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The ad hoc Security Committee reviewed post orders department-wide to
ensure inmate and staff access is restricted wherever indicated.
|
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
b. Lewis’ Post Order 051 should be revised to include
specific instructions on entry and exit from the tower. The practice of
"buzzing in" people from the upper floors or not confirming
identification on a face-to-face basis should be considered a serious
breach of performance standards. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Post order 051 has been revised to include supervisor pre-approval
via radio and requires the officer assigned to the tower to obtain
positive visual-verbal identification at ground level.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Post orders department-wide modified to curtail inmate and staff
access wherever indicated and prescribe process by which verification
occurs. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
21. On the longer term, DOC should review the
operational and tactical merits of maintaining lethal and
less-than-lethal weapons and munitions in a central tower location
within a secured perimeter. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The assessment of tower utility and utilization, staffing and
equipment including preferred lethal and less-than-lethal weapons, is
completed. The arsenal in towers in high custody yards is equipped with
lethal force. The arsenal in towers in lower security yards now equipped
with non-lethal force. Corresponding changes including modifications to
the physical plant and arming weapons’ posts have been made.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The ad hoc Security Committee surveyed other states’ correctional
systems for the field’s best and next practices. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
22. DOC should require post-specific training
pertaining to the tower. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Featured in the department’s current strategic plan is the assessment
and improvement of the pre-service training curriculum and the expansion
of OJT for additional on-site post-specific training. Post-specific
training being provided to all staff assigned to armed posts.
NB: The March 2003 Buckley after-action also recommended.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Included in the newly instituted peer-review assessment process is
proficiency testing of correctional personnel to benchmark their ability
to perform core correctional practices and provide OJRT when needed.
Staff will monitor inmates’ compliance with the grooming policy and
when an inmate receives a shaving exemption, a new photo ID will be
issued to reflect his change in status. When the exemption expires and
the inmate resumes shaving, another photo ID will be issued.
|
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
23. Only shift-assigned tower staff, tower relief
staff and shift supervisors should be allowed to access the tower
without the shift commander’s direct approval. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The revised post order prohibits inmate access and restricts staff
access to towers. Access by any person other than shift-assigned tower
staff, tower relief staff and shift supervisors requires the shift
commander’s pre-approval.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The ad hoc Security Committee identified other security posts
requiring similar restriction and revision of those post orders in
process; for example, control rooms. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
24. a. DOC should review tower design and |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The principles in the firm, Arrington Watkins, Architects, that
designed Lewis were interviewed to reconstruct the functions for which
the towers were intended when it was constructed as well as any change
orders to the physical plant that may have followed impacting the
towers’ operation including tower usage, staffing and equipment, and
yard traffic to determine the reasons for changing its utilization over
time. The architects reported that the towers were not intended to be
armed posts as evidenced by differences in staircases between the first
and second levels, the kind of opening to the roof and flashing light on
the control panel when the hatch opens, the roofing material and the
lack of a weapons rack. Moreover, the tower was never intended to be a
repository for spare mattresses and confiscated shanks, or a place to
distribute/ store inmate prescription drugs.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
An ad hoc Security Committee reviewed recent years’ after-action
reports beginning with the homicide of CO Lumley in 1997 and including
most recently a March 2003 after-action report following staff assaults
at the ASPC-Lewis Buckley Unit to identify longstanding, unresolved
recommendations that would improve staff safety but were never
implemented prior to the January 2004 hostage incident. Examples of
precautions that were approved but never acted upon prior to the most
recent problems at ASPC-Lewis include restricting inmates’ access to
towers and control rooms, providing post specific training to officers
assigned to the Towers, eliminating non-security activities conducted
from secure posts, and securing kitchen offices, using metal detectors
and hand held trans-friskers to search inmates, improving the quality of
pat searches by emphasizing staff supervision and training, mentoring
staff and expanding the use of Field Training Officers. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
b. make modifications necessary to allow full
operations from the second level. |
TBD; see 17 |
DISCUSSION
The assessment of tower utility and utilization, staffing, equipment
and technology, is completed.
·18 The ad hoc Security Committee included
in its survey of state correctional systems’ design and utilization
of towers whether interior towers are armed in some or all custody
level yards, if the weapons are lethal, from what vantage point does
an officer discharge weapons and what protection is afforded him.
ADC has made modifications to the physical plant, post orders, and
staffing where indicated.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The ad hoc Committee will identify other security areas that are also
being used for non-security purposes for immediate action. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
25. DOC should review, modify as needed, and strictly
enforce tower post orders to ensure consistency of tower operations,
with emphasis on security. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The revised post order prohibits inmate access and restricts staff
access to towers.
·19 Access by any person other than
shift-assigned tower staff, tower relief staff and shift supervisors
requires the shift commander’s pre-approval.
·20 All non-security functions such as
on-person medication distribution, housing the evidence locker, and
the storage of spare mattresses have been discontinued.
The number of security keys on the Tower sets are reduced.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The ad hoc Security Committee identified other security posts needing
similar restrictions and revised those post orders.
Keep-on-person (KOP) medication is now dispensed to inmates when mail
is delivered at the unit, a process that better utilizes staff time and
saves space. This practice was piloted at ASPC-Lewis and is being
replicated statewide. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
26. The tower should always be staffed with two
qualified officers, both armed with side arms at all times. When
granting access to the tower, one officer should remain at the
observation level while the second officer acquires positive
identification. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The posts and post orders for the towers at ASPC-Lewis have been
revised to require two officers are assigned to the tower during
daylight hours and whenever there is inmate movement in the yard. The
post order further specifies that one officer remains at the observation
level while the second officer acquires positive visual-verbal
identification at ground level.
The arsenal in towers in high custody yards is equipped with lethal
force. The arsenal in towers in lower security yards is equipped with
non-lethal force. Officers assigned to armory posts equipped with lethal
force are issued and wear side arms. Officers assigned to armory posts
equipped with non-lethal force are not issued side arms.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
|
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
27. Tower and munitions should be kept at
"at-the-ready" at all times when the tower is staffed. Weapons stands
are probably the most effective way of keeping weapons readily
accessible. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Post orders at ASPC-Lewis were modified to reflect policy and specify
weapons are loaded and ammunition is stored in Tower.
Fixed stands and secure weapons lockers are installed.
Regional oversight teams established to verify compliance.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The ad hoc Security Committee also surveyed other state correctional
systems. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
| E. DEFENSIVE
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES |
|
28. a. Modify PO #051.06.8.1 to include Department
Order 804.07.1.2.6. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The policy is rewritten clearly and is easy to understand.
Staff receives in-service training at shift briefings.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The post orders for all armed posts are being modified. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
b. Reinforce knowledge and understanding of that
order in training and exercises. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The use-of-force policy now reviewed annually during in-service
training.
Staff’s understanding of policy assessed during core competency
assessment process. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
29. Consider adding other, more effective
less-than-lethal weapons for day-to-day operations of correctional
officers. This consideration should be to integrate such systems into
standard operations rather than limiting those capabilities to special
situations. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The ad hoc Security Committee contacted other states to identify best
practices. ADC utilization of tazers exceeds most other state
correctional systems. ADC selected a more effective aerosol product and
standardized its deployment of handheld chemical agents.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The Technology Review Committee assessments discontinued in 2002;
assessments reinstated. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
30. All DOC employees and contractors who directly
interface with inmates should receive realistic training in self-defense
tactics. Such training should be integrated into in-service refresher
training programs. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Featured in the department’s current strategic plan is the assessment
and improvement of the pre-service training curriculum to include Back
to Basics (B2B) skill building and the expansion of OJT for ADC and
contract employees to include more post-specific self-defense tactics
training.
·21 The relief factor to be adjusted and
additional FTE may be needed as the numbers of hours of instruction
increases.
Included in the agency reorganization is the integration of all
training functions into one unit.
COTA confers with POST.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Included in the newly instituted peer-review assessment process is
proficiency testing of correctional personnel to benchmark their ability
to perform core correctional practices and provide OJRT when needed.
|
Future funding
|
Support Services |
|
31. a. Correctional officers should receive enhanced
and realistic training in hand-to-hand, weapons, and small-unit
defensive tactics. Such training should be integrated into in-service
training. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Featured in the department’s current strategic plan is the assessment
and improvement of its pre-service training curriculum to include B2B
skill building and the expansion of OJT to provide enhanced and
realistic training in hand-to-hand, weapons, and small-unit defensive
tactics in-service training.
Pre-service and in-service instruction has been expanded. Staff has
participated in a 32-hour in-service self-defense program.
Continuous physical conditioning training is offered as well.
COTA confers with POST.
Included in the agency 2004 reorganization is the integration of all
training functions into one unit.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Included in the newly instituted peer-review assessment process is
proficiency testing of correctional personnel to benchmark their ability
to perform core correctional practices and provide OJRT when needed.
|
Implemented |
Support Services |
| b. Consider
requiring minimum qualification standards and recognition/certification
programs for advanced proficiency, which would be considered in
assignment decisions and operational planning. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Staff demonstrating proficiency shall be recognized. Selection for
participation in TSU requires advanced proficiency. Superior performance
to be reflected in development of the master classification.
COTA consults with POST and confers with sister states as well to
evaluate efficacy of assigning certain staff to particular posts.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Continuous physical conditioning is offered as well. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
| F.
COMMUNICATIONS |
|
32. DOC should review current communication systems
with the emphasis on improving performance. Such review should include
reducing dead areas, the benefits of encryption, specialized distress
capability, battery dependency, and radio durability. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
No facility has one kind of radio and charger and the brands and
models in the units are not interchangeable. In addition, there are not
enough radios to issue to all staff on the shift. Some radios have
personal alarms but none of the alarms is activated.
The ad hoc Security Committee assessed security equipment including
radios with distress call capability and other encrypted and electronic
communication devices, and chargers and batteries. The number and kind
of radios, repeaters, batteries, and chargers have been identified and
requested.
NB: The April 1997 Perryville and March 2003 Buckley after-actions
recommended replacing radios and adding repeaters.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The Technology Review Committee conferred with other states to
evaluate current technology. The ad hoc Security Committee identified
blackout areas and dead zones in the facilities and developed interim
measures to improve staff safety. |
Phase 1 funding |
Offender Operations |
|
33. DOC should review units’ audio and visual
monitoring capabilities and consider retrofitting key facilities with
embedded sensors and cameras for regular monitoring of activities. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The ad hoc Security Committee assessed the quality and quantity of
its current security equipment including cameras, monitors, and radios
and chargers.
The Offender Operations Division evaluated the available technology
and conferred with other states.
As additional cameras are added, posts to monitor cameras will be
established and additional FTE may be requested. |
Future funding |
Offender Operations |
|
34. Establish a simple distress signal. Evidence
suggests that inmates had gathered intelligence on communication
procedures and radio codes. A distress signal would therefore need to
should be natural and part of a routine response. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The ad hoc Security Committee conferred with other states. Included
in communication package.
|
Phase 1 funding |
Offender Operations |
|
35. DOC should also consider investment in personnel
monitoring - "man down" or personal alarm systems. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The Offender Operations Division evaluated available technology,
consulted with the industry, and conferred with other states as to their
experiences with specific brands and models prior to developing its
request. |
Phase 1 funding |
Offender Operations |
| G. INDIVIDUAL
AND UNIT RESPONSE |
|
36. Training (IMS simulations) should not occur
during duty hours. Occasionally, if supervisors want to test the
performance of their staff on a fire drill or lockdown, on-unit training
would be recommended. However, training designed to test and evaluates
tactical responses, arrest procedures, use of lethal and
less-than-lethal force, and even medical response should never be
conducted where it could compromise security or be viewed by inmates.
Exceptions may be made only with the written approval of the DOC
Director. Training should be as realistic as possible, but there should
be no doubt in any staff member’s mind about whether a situation is a
simulation or a real event. This is accomplished by never blending duty
assignments with training scenarios. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Tactical training now routinely conducted on site to adequately
prepare line staff and officers assigned to Designated Armed Response
Team (DART) and tactical teams to respond to institution-specific
untoward events.
An ad hoc Training Committee convened a panel of subject matter
experts in the areas of IMS/training including POST, to evaluate best
and next practices.
The current Incident Management System (IMS) modified to include
express expectations for in-service and on-duty training.
·22 Simulations and drills will be clearly
identified at all times as training exercises.
·23 Simulations and drills thoroughly
evaluated.
·24 Simulations and drills conducted to
minimize inmate exposure to tactical operations.
·25 Assigned staff respond timely; failure
to timely respond will result in referral for administrative review.
An increase in hours of training may require adjusting the relief
factor resulting in a request for additional FTE.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The release of the revised tactical teams’ (TSU) manual and 14 other
essential security policies including the IMS policy stalled as far back
as 2001. The documents have been reviewed and approved. Inter-agency
drills on-site and in the community with law enforcement in process:
·26 Negotiation teams to drill with law
enforcement.
·27 Tactical teams to drill with law
enforcement.
·28 Tactical and negotiation teams to drill
with law. enforcement on the grounds of prison complexes.
|
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
37. DOC sergeants must be recognized as a focal point
of the agency and given the power to address issues immediately. The
first-line supervisor is the unit’s eyes and ears and can identify
training deficiencies, operational issues and performance problems. The
sergeant should be highly visible as he or she moves about the unit and
conducts surprise inspections at various posts; this would help to
eliminate reported unauthorized visits to the tower and the leaving of
assigned posts. It would also help address the allegations of officers
bringing food into the unit from outside the prison, propping doors
open, conducting quick and ineffective pat searches, etc. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Featured in the department’s current strategic plan is the assessment
and improvement of its supervisory and managerial training to include
pre-promotional B2B skill building for line staff prior to promotion and
the expansion of OJT to provide more hours of on-site training for newly
promoted staff.
·29 COTA has reviewed and is revising its
training programs for first line supervisors.
·30 Wardens are returning sergeants
whenever possible to the yards and housing units to supervise line
officers.
An ad hoc committee is also reviewing and revising post orders to
provide addition guidance to sergeants whose visibility on the yards and
in the housing units is increasing.
·31 The Committee consults with POST and
surveys state correctional systems for best and promising practices.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Included in the newly instituted peer-review assessment process is
proficiency testing of correctional personnel to benchmark their ability
to perform core correctional practices and provide OJRT when needed.
·32 ASPC-Lewis supervisors and managers
were tested first because their ability to supervise and coach
others is directly related to their proficiency performing core
correctional functions. 29 percent failed perform with 80 percent
proficiency.
·33 All line staff was tested as well. 27%
of its officers scored below the 70th percentile (POST
standard).
·34 All staff who failed to earn proficient
scores successfully completed OJRT in-service training.
|
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
38. On-duty training opportunities should be
explored, such as daily training items that are presented and discussed
at briefings or when supervisors conduct inspections. These training
items can consist of incident scenarios that are read or presented,
requiring officers to discuss their answers with their supervisors. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Line staff is present at shift briefings.
In-service instruction was provided to supervisors. All sergeants
have completed its leadership academy. Supervisors are now proficient in
the presentation of briefing materials and maintain accurate training
records of subordinate employees attending shift briefings. Regional
oversight teams verify compliance.
COTA confers with POST and surveyed other states for best practices
in the areas of staff scheduling, lesson plans, and training records.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Following the peer review assessment of a complex, COTA prepared B2B
shift briefing/sample lessons addressing certain core competencies
identified in the process as requiring additional review by line staff
and supervisors.
|
Implemented |
Support Services |
| H.
INTER-AGENCY DELIVERY OF TACTICAL, INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND
NEGOTIATION ACTIVITIES |
|
39. DOC and State and local law enforcement agencies
should regularly convene to practice tactical maneuvers. Some scenarios
should be conducted regularly on the grounds of a State prison complex. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION Some tactical training now
routinely scheduled on site with outside agencies to adequately prepare
line staff and officers assigned to DART and TSU to respond to
institution-specific untoward events. More agency employees also train
with outside agencies off site. An ad hoc Training Committee convened a
panel of subject matter experts including POST in the areas of IMS/training
to evaluate best and next practices and set standards for consistent,
uniform efforts by the complexes interfacing with outside agencies.
Development of inter-agency efforts will continue.
The current Incident Management System (IMS) modified to include
express expectations for structured in-service and on-duty training.
·35 Agency manuals for tactical and
negotiation teams reviewed, revised
·36 Simulations and drills clearly
identified at all times as training exercises.
·37 Simulations and drills thoroughly
evaluated.
·0 Simulations and drills conducted to
minimize inmate exposure to tactical operations.
·0 Assigned staff responds timely; failure
to timely respond will result in referral for administrative review.
An increase in hours of training may require adjusting the relief
factor resulting in a request for additional FTE. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
40. DOC and State and local law enforcement agencies
should regularly convene to practice negotiations. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION Law enforcement contacted to
identify scenarios and develop an inter-agency schedule to drill
together on-site and in the community. NB: The TSU manual, revised but
never released in 2001, called for realistic training in hostage
negotiations.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
ADC to replace existing radios with ones whose frequencies are
compatible with outside agencies and transmissions cannot be picked up
by inmates or any others but on a need-to-know basis. |
Implemented
Phase 1 funding |
Offender Operations |
|
41. DOC, with assistance from federal, State and
local law enforcement agencies, should evaluate DOC’s physical
structures to identify in advance of untoward events their amenability
to intelligence collection and tactical maneuvers. This information
should be kept onsite at each institution and updated regularly.
|
Agree |
DISCUSSION ADC has conferred with the
FBI, DPS, and MCSO. The assessment is on-going.
|
Implemented |
Support Services |
| I. RESOLUTION
OF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION |
|
42. DOC should review the communications that
occurred between negotiators and tactical staff relating to the cutting
of the fence at the base of the Morey tower. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION ADC, DPS, MCSO, and the FBI
have participated in an after-action review. Those discussions
incorporated into future inter-agency drills scenarios and used to
revise agencies’ command structure and IMS policies. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
|
43. Due to the uniqueness of the situation and the
virtually impenetrable characteristics of the tower, the lack of
acceptable tactical solutions available to authorities made negotiations
a practical necessity. To be consistent with other law enforcement and
correctional agencies, DOC should eliminate its non-negotiation policy. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION ADC surveyed all state
correctional systems of which number, 47 have policies providing for
negotiation; one is developing its policy; only Oregon prohibits
negotiation.
The ADC "non-negotiation" policy is misleading in its construction as
it meant to impart negotiation for unlawful considerations only is
prohibited, and is contrary to its longstanding ADC practice of training
and maintaining 30 negotiators. That policy is revised and released.
NB: The TSU manual was revised in January 2001 but not released. Its
stated goal of negotiation is to gain the release of hostages and secure
custody of hostage takers. It directs deadly force will only be used as
the last resort and only after other means to resolve the situation are
exhausted. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
44. The use-of-force provisions of the rules of
engagement were appropriate and should be applied to future situations
where their use may be applicable. At the Morey Unit, circumstances did
not permit the exercise of those provisions.
|
Agree |
DISCUSSION The department maintains
current manuals, established agency-wide standards for equipment, and
provides inter-agency training for TSU, negotiators and investigations
to ensure assigned staff responds timely, consistently, and proficiently
to situations requiring able tactical responders, expert negotiators,
skilled profilers, and well equipped investigators ready to collect and
analyze intelligence. Rules of engagement incorporated into staff
self-defense in-service training. |
Implemented |
Offender Operations |
| J.
ADMINISTRATIVE, POLICY AND BUDGET ISSUES |
|
45. DOC should assess its inmate classification needs
and seek national assistance in the enhancement, overhaul or replacement
of its present system. DOC’s policies and procedures regarding
protective segregation should be reviewed as part of the assessment.
|
Agree |
DISCUSSION The National Institute of
Corrections (NIC) was contacted and is providing nationally recognized
subject-matter experts in classification to assist ADC:
·38 Update and validate classification
policies and procedures for male and female offenders
·39 Determine risk (dangerousness) to self
and others
·40 Identify and better manage Protective
Segregation (PS) voluntary and involuntary populations including
de-briefed STG members
·41 Determine appropriate inmate work
assignments
·42 Reduce classification overrides
·43 Ascertain the amenability of sex
offenders and substance abusers to treatment
·44 Refer inmates in need to substance
abuse, mental health and sex offender treatment
·45 Ascertain inmates’ pre-release
readiness
·46 Capture input by line staff and work
supervisors
Validation of new instrument to occur this fiscal year. All inmates
to be classified with validated instrument by 12/31/05. |
Implemented
|
Programs Services |
|
46. Public and Institutional (P&I) scores should be
more closely examined, and the officers who work with an inmate should
have meaningful input into that inmate’s score. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION Revisions include assessment
of history of escape, violence, and prior institutional adjustment; and
home plan.
Sex offender scoring criteria completed and implemented.
The revised instrument and its validation will solicit the input of
line staff and work supervisors. |
Implemented |
Programs Services |
|
47. Classification scores should be less vulnerable
to override. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION The revised instrument will
reduce classification overrides. Further, an override will require
approval by central office. |
Implemented |
Programs Services |
|
48. Create a system that better ensures that more
dangerous inmates do not work insensitive areas. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION The revised instrument will
ensure inmate work assignments are appropriate. Distinctions between
assignments in prison and the community refined.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
ADC has identified housing units and work locations where inmates in
more than one custody level or classification were located and is
developing alternative housing assignment options.
NB: Included in the design assumptions for ASPC-Lewis is that only
one custody level would be housed in any unit. |
Implemented |
Programs Services |
|
49. a. DOC should evaluate the methods by which, upon
intake, it assesses offenders’ criminogenic and programming needs. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION The revised instrument will
incorporate the revised classification policies and procedures for all
offenders.
It will also provide for the determination of risk (dangerousness) to
self and others and amenability of sex offenders and substance abusers
to treatment.
Further, ADC now triages inmates at intake with 6 or fewer months to
serve and fast tracks those offenders through classification to re-entry
preparation.
More instruments are being automated to reduce time to assess. |
Implemented |
Programs Services |
|
b. It should further endeavor to provide appropriate
levels of programming in areas such as mental health treatment, drug
treatment and education. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION The revised instrument will
consider the amenability of sex offenders and substance abusers to
treatment and provide for the referrals to substance abuse, mental
health and sex offender treatment.
Featured in the department’s current strategic plan is the
expectation that all inmates in need of intervention will be identified
and receive mental health treatment, drug and alcohol treatment, sex
offender treatment and academic and vocational education within 3 years.
·47 During FY2004 all treatment slots fully
utilized; number of inmates earning GED, doubled.
·48 During FY2005 capacity to treat inmates
in need increases to serve one third of the offender population
·49 During FY2006 capacity to treat inmates
in need will increase to serve two thirds of the offender population
·50 During FY2007 capacity to treat inmates
in need will increase to serve all of the eligible offender
population
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Inmates with elevated mental health needs have been identified and
are being consolidated in units at several correctional complexes close
to population centers where qualified mental health professionals are
readily available to provide treatment services. Step down medical beds
to be available later this year.
The housing assignments of sex offenders was also revised so that
only offenders currently serving a sentence for a sexual offense are
housed together thus reducing the demand for dedicated housing for sex
offenders by 20 percent. |
Implemented |
Programs Services |
|
c. Programming should also be enhanced to assist
offenders in successfully reentering society upon release from prison.
|
Agree |
DISCUSSION Featured in the department’s
current strategic plan is the expectation that all inmates serving a
sentence of a term of years will successfully complete pre-release
preparation training and participate in Re-Entry programming as
appropriate:
·51 About 2/3 of all admissions serve an
average of 46 months. This population is assigned to pre-release
preparation programming and then, about one year before release
received re-entry specific services, many in Level-1 units.
·52 About 1/3 of all admissions serve an
average of 6 or fewer months. This population is placed directly in
re-entry specific services.
To reduce high rates of revocation, ADC also operates SB1291
transition services for certain drug offenders and TOTL for technical
violators of community corrections conditions of release. HB 2646 to be
implemented shortly. |
Implemented |
Programs Services |
|
50. As appropriate to carry out their
responsibilities and ensure their personal safety, officers, supervisors
and civilian employees should receive continuing education and practical
training in areas that include, but are not limited to, the following:
Self defense, weapons training, hostage situations, post-specific
training, weapons and contraband searches, Fire Arms Training Simulator
(FATS), cross-training with other law enforcement agencies, Arizona
Peace Officer Standards & Training (POST) certification, and structures
on-the-job training and mentors. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Featured in the department’s new strategic plan is the assessment and
improvement of its staff training emphasizing B2B skills building for
line staff and supervisors and the expansion of pre-service, in-service
and OJT to provide more hours of on-site training for all personnel
including:
·53 Core competencies including searches of
persons and property, shakedowns, and applying restraints,
·54 Self-defense
·55 Lethal and less than lethal weapons
·56 Hostage situations and rape prevention
·57 Post-specific training
An expanded pre-service OJT segment is being piloted at ASPC-Florence;
pending completion and evaluation, adoption department-wide.
COTA consults with POST and surveyed state correctional systems for
best and promising practices.
Cross-training with others in law enforcement occurs.
An increase in the hours of instruction may impact the Relief Factor
and require additional FTE for affected posts.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Included in the newly instituted peer-review assessment process is
proficiency testing of correctional personnel to benchmark their ability
to perform core correctional practices and provide OJRT when needed.
·58 Assessments ascertain staff’s ability
to perform proficiently core correctional competencies including
self defense, weapons, and contraband searches.
ADC is developing a Master Class designation for presentation to DOA
for its approval to recognize excellence and identify proficient senior
staff to serve as Mentors. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
51. At the Correctional Officer Training Academy (COTA),
cadets should receive one full additional week of training dedicated to
self-defense and receive additional training in hostage situations, rape
prevention, and weapons. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Additional hours of instruction in self-defense training plus weapons
instruction and certification provided during pre-service to officers
and annually thereafter during in-service instruction. The lesson plan
for surviving a hostage situation revised and training on rape
prevention developed; also to be provided to civilian staff.
COTA consults with POST and other DOC academies.
An increase in the hours of instruction may impact the Relief Factor
and require additional FTE for affected posts.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
COTA assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of training provided
at COTA versus its regional academies to ensure staff is proficient in
their execution of core correctional practices and understanding of
basic policies and procedures. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
52. Standards for admission to and graduation from
COTA must not be compromised in response to vacancy rates or other
temporary situations. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
The eligibility criteria for graduation from COTA have been compared
to other states’ correctional systems and COTA has conferred with POST.
Compromising current standards is not acceptable and will not be
considered. Raising standards however, will require an increase in
salary and benefits. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
53. New COTA graduates should enter service as a COI.
After a defined probationary period, and additional on-the-job training,
they should become eligible for promotion to CO II.
|
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Development of a comprehensive pay plan proposal including the
restoration of the COI was submitted to and approved by DOA and then
presented by ADC to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees last
February. The COII classification was reinstated by ADOA 7/1/04. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
54. DOC should implement a comprehensive and
systematic "Back to Basics" (B2B) program to ensure that core elements
of security are being adhered to across the board. The B2B initiative
should be designed to enable every prison to review security in regard
to layout, personnel, habits, traditions, training and other issues. B2B
should include interviews with line staff to find out how they actually
do the job and how they should do the job, so that it can be determined
whether security is being compromised by not adhering to post orders, or
whether officers have devised a better way to get desired results. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Assessment of correctional personnel
Featured in the department’s new strategic plan is the assessment and
improvement of pre-service, in-service and promotional training programs
to include Back to Basic (B2B) skill building for line staff and
supervisors, the expansion of OJT for all ADC employees, and the
introduction OJRT (0n-the-Job-Retraining) for employees whose mastery of
core correctional competencies is less than proficient.
Assessment of correctional complexes and community corrections
offices
Featured now in the department’s strategic plan is the newly
instituted peer-review assessment process to ascertain a work unit’s
compliance with its policies and procedures, line staff and supervisors’
execution of their duties, organizational culture and climate for
professional growth. The unit is audited for compliance and its staff is
tested to benchmark its performance of core correctional practices.
·59 Where deficiencies in the work place
are identified, they are fixed or an action plan is prepared by the
peer review team in conjunction with the work unit.
·60 Where deficiencies in staff’s
performance of its duties are identified, OJRT is provided.
·61 Where work place findings are
exceptional, it is recognized.
·62 Where staff mastery of materials is
exceptional, it is reflected in the PACE entry.
To accomplish these goals, included in the agency 2004 reorganization
is the integration of all training functions into one unit.
Where the relief factor is adjusted to ensure sufficient staff is on
post as well in class, additional FTE may be requested to cover the
number of hours that instruction increases.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
Status, Peer – Review Assessment process at ASPC-Lewis
The peer-review process was piloted at ASPC-Lewis on 2/22.
Phase 1 focused the complex’s compliance with policy, staff’s
mastery of core correctional practices, and complex culture. It included
staff interviews and on-site observations of the prison’s operation on
every shift from 2/22 through 2/25. The preliminary report that followed
identified 13 action areas containing 66 recommendations, all of which
have been resolved. Phase 2, a more in-depth evaluation of the
complex’s compliance with core security practices and staff’s
proficiency performing those functions, began on 3/1 and concluded on
3/26. At ASPC-Lewis, a total of 425 deficiencies were noted in the 16
areas evaluated; all but one has been resolved satisfactorily; one item
requires action by an outside vendor. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
55. Civilian employees should receive training to
help them understand and function safely in a prison environment. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Featured in the department’s new strategic plan is the assessment and
improvement of pre-service, in-service and promotional training programs
for civilian employees as well as uniformed personnel to include Back to
Basic (B2B) instruction in selected safety and security issues.
COTA reviews and revises as necessary pre-service and in-service
instructional programs for professional, clerical and support civilian
ADC employees and contract personnel.
An increase in hours of pre-service and in-service instruction may
increase the number of instructional personnel required. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
56. DOC should formalize the blending of experienced
and inexperienced officers, leading to "mentor/student" bonding that can
enhance long-term officer success and retention. The mentor program
should be formalized as a structured, agency-wide Correctional Training
Officer (CTO) program that features formal training and rewards for
experienced officers, at all levels and positions, who act as mentors. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
ADC is finalizing equitable processes to revise staff work schedules
and reassign uniformed personnel to post assignments as needed to
balance the numbers of more and less experienced officers per shift and
work location.
·63 A work group developed a Roster
Management system to be used at all complexes to ensure equitable
rotation of mandatory overtime assignments of experienced and
inexperienced officers.
·64 A work group completed its analyses of
post deployment across complexes by custody levels and cross
leveling practices impacting experienced and inexperienced officers.
·65 A work group concluded its assessment
of the current manning formula to ensure adequate shift coverage of
experienced and inexperienced officers.
·66 A work group is revisiting staffing
levels assumptions.
·67 The COI is reestablished.
·68 The specialist class to be developed
for ADOA review.
ADC will formalize its Field Training Officers (FTO) initiative as a
structured, agency-wide program featuring:
·69 Rigorous selection standards
·70 Structured training
·71 On-going technical assistance and
support
·72 Financial compensation
·73 Organizational recognition
ADC will continue to confer with POST and other state correctional
academies to identify and adopt the field’s best and next practices.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
ADC is developing a Master class for all job classifications and will
submit to DOA for approval to further recognize excellence in the
workplace. An employee may earn Master class status by serving in a
position for a period of years during which time PACE entries and
attendance are good and proficiency is demonstrated.
An ad hoc Committee of line staff and supervisors is evaluating the
PACE entry process to recommend improved practices. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
57. Additional staffing is necessary for all
assignments within DOC in order to combat fatigue and burn-out and to
foster proper employee in-service training needs. Current "bare bones"
staffing does not allow for the remediation of any of the above. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
ADC delineates levels of staffing and institutional activity levels
from fewest staff and least institutional activity (D level) to most (A
level).
·74 The system assumes when D-level staff
is available, only D level activity will occur.
·75 In actuality, the majority of the
complexes operates with D-level staffing and performs A-level
activity most of the time.
ADC agreed that it should determine the recommended level at which
institutional activities occur and staff its complexes accordingly.
An ad hoc Committee reviewed recent reports:
·76 1997 Perryville After-Action concerning
eliminating IGA work details at D-level staffing
·77 1998 Deland staffing study
·78 2001 State Auditor Report requesting a
staffing study
·79 2002 Camp staffing study
The ad hoc Committee also revisited assumptions re: D-level staffing
and A-level activities:
·80 Reassessed the studies’ post analyses
·81 Reviewed and revised the current relief
factor
·82 Will recommend an alternative staffing
plan for an established activity level
·83 Will recommend circumstances when
for-profit work crews are released to the community or cancelled
The Committee also contacted others states systems re: effective
recruitment practices
·84 It also conferred with other AZ state
agencies about staff allowances for travel time and cost.
·85 ADC also exploring development of a
Reserve Officer program.
An increase in the security series department-wide with enhancements
at ASPC-Lewis is being sought this year. |
Future funding |
Offender Services |
|
58. DOC should undertake a comprehensive analysis
of its pay scale, including a comparison with the pay scales of
federal, county and municipal correctional entities in Arizona and
of surrounding states.
|
Agree |
DISCUSSION
ADC undertook an analysis of uniformed salaries last year. It has
been updated.
Development of a competitive and comprehensive pay plan proposal for
ADC’s three largest work groups – the corrections, programs, and
community supervision series – was submitted to and approved by DOA and
then presented by ADC to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
in February. No action was taken. An across-the-board increase in the
security series department-wide with enhancements at ASPC-Lewis is
sought this year.
Analysis of medical, clerical, maintenance and other staff in
process. |
Phase 1 funding |
Support Services |
|
59. DOC should consider the reinstatement of merit
increases and longevity pay. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Development of comprehensive pay plan proposal including the
reinstatement of merit increases and longevity pay was submitted to and
approved by DOA and then presented by ADC to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees in February. No action was taken. |
Future funding |
Support Services |
|
60. DOC should restore the CO I position, reexamine
the qualifications for Sergeant, and undertake a comprehensive review of
DOC’s promotional policies to ensure they are based on merit and
performance, not "good old boy" relationships. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Development of comprehensive pay plan proposal including the
reinstatement of the COI job class was submitted to and approved by DOA
and then presented by ADC to the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees in February. The COI was reinstated 7/1/04.
The Committee consisting of line staff and supervisors has evaluated
the promotional process, reevaluated the Vicchio study about
sergeant qualifications and selection, and developed recommendations now
adopted. |
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
61. Pay must be commensurate with experience and
merit, and any promotion should result in higher pay. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Development of the promotional pay plan for security, community
corrections, and programs personnel reflects years of service and
recognizes meritorious service was completed by ADC and is approved by
DOA. A presentation was provided to House and Senate Appropriations
Committees in February. No action was taken.
Development of "Master" class rank for all positions in process.
Person who earn Master class status have years on service in grade, good
attendance, proficiency and positive PACE entries.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
An ad hoc Committee also evaluated the impact of a shift differential
on recruitment and retention for certain job classes. |
Future funding |
Support Services |
|
62. DOC should consider ways of communicating to the
public the difficulty of and danger associated with correctional
service. |
Agree
|
DISCUSSION
An ad hoc Committee is conferring with law enforcement in its
development of a Citizen’s Academy, a Reserve Officer program, and
Correctional Volunteer program.
ADC will develop a speaker’s bureau featuring line staff and CISD
responders.
The public information office will develop opportunities to expose
the public to the work of correctional employees.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
The ADC general counsel conferred with the office of the AG to
develop effective processes to provide timely responses to public
information requests.
The ADC office of Constituent Services is improving its methods of
communicating with family members and friends of inmates during an IMS.
The ADC personnel unit evaluated the impact of CISD and is improving
peer support programs for staff and crime victims. |
Implemented |
Director’s Office |
|
63. Survivors of officers killed in the line of duty
should receive benefits comparable to the families of police officers
and fire fighters. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
ADC officers receive benefits as provided by federal legislation
enacted in 2003. Law enforcement and correctional systems were surveyed
and identified years-to-retirement and overtime
credits-towards-retirement as benefits to pursue legislatively.
The 100 Club and other organizations were consulted, too.
|
Implemented |
Support Services |
|
64. The DOC Director should utilize all available
information to determine what, if any, disciplinary action or change of
assignment is appropriate for those staff involved. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Nine senior administrative staff temporarily reassigned pending
completion of the administrative review process at which point,
disciplinary action was determined to be warranted for eight of them.
There have been one dismissal, one retirement in lieu of dismissal, four
demotions, two suspensions, and one letter of caution with permanent
transfer.
ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
An ad hoc Committee is evaluating correctional managers’ use of
agency policies 508 and 601 to identify opportunities and formulate
recommendations to improve disciplinary processes by making it as even
in its application and quick to resolve as possible. |
Implemented |
Director’s Office |
|
65. A system-wide review should take place to
determine whether this problem is pervasive in the system and, if so, to
identify and implement steps that could remedy the problem of
deficiencies in supervision and performance. |
Agree |
DISCUSSION
Status, Peer – Review Assessment process at ASPC-Lewis
The peer-review process was piloted at ASPC-Lewis on 2/22.
·86 Phase 1 focused the complex’s
compliance with policy, staff’s mastery of core correctional
practices, and complex culture. It included staff i |
